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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Grassroots Women's Civic–Religious Networks, Moral Economy Norms, and Voter Resistance to Electoral Clientelism in Decentralizing Democracies: Multilevel Spatial Modeling and Comparative Case Synthesis

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ABSTRACT

Background: Decentralization and candidate-centered elections intensify grassroots vote buying. It is disputed whether women's civic–religious networks, such as *Majelis Taklim*, *Dasa Wisma*, and PKK in Indonesia or faith-civic groups in the Philippines, channel handouts or support voter resistance.

Objective: To test whether civic–religious networks attract clientelist targeting, support voter resistance, or both, and under which conditions.

Methods: We analyzed 325,362 public records in four tiers: AmericasBarometer multilevel data (N = 212,561) with a Mexican vignette experiment (N = 1,590); SAR and SDM models for 211 Indonesian districts; AIPW and RIF analyses of voters and brokers in Central Java, Gowa, and the Philippines; and fuzzy-set QCA of 28 regimes.

Results: A vote-buying vignette lowered trust by 4.34 points in unsaturated contexts ($p = 0.0202$). *Waqf* endowments had a SAR total impact of +2.50 pp ($p = 0.021$) that the SDM model did not reproduce; BMT cooperatives had an SDM total impact of +5.96 pp ($p = 0.0401$; spillover $p = 0.074$). Mass religious membership was associated with +12.55 pp cash targeting ($p = 0.0142$), whereas combined civic–religious membership showed no association with resistance ($p = 0.7739$). Bribe recognition was associated with +13.53 pp conscience defection ($p = 0.0151$) and formal networks with +10.12 pp machine defection in the Philippines ($p = 0.0417$). fsQCA yielded a moral-shield configuration (consistency 0.8342) and a gift-capture configuration (0.8878).

Conclusion: Civic–religious networks can both attract handouts and support resistance. Resistance was associated with anti-bribery norms, ballot secrecy, autonomous endowments, and participatory budgeting.

All authors approved the final version of the manuscript.

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1. Introduction

1.1. Decentralization, candidate-centered patronage, and the puzzle of grassroots civic–religious networks

In contemporary decentralizing democracies of Southeast Asia, Latin America, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa, administrative authority and public budgets have moved to provincial, municipal, and village governments. Accountability did not follow automatically. Where decentralization coincides with weak party organizations or open-list candidate competition, elections frequently turn toward widespread grassroots handouts. The forms vary. They include cash envelopes ('*serangan fajar*' or 'dawn attacks' in Indonesia), staple-food packages ('*sembako*'), personalized emergency assistance, and dense pyramids of neighborhood campaign brokers ('*tim sukses*' in Indonesia; '*lideres*' in the Philippines).[1,2] Weak-party states rarely run tightly monitored spot markets in which parties verify individual ballots, so electoral handouts there routinely serve to buy broker loyalty, signal candidate viability, and activate social networks.[1,2] Comparative cross-national and experimental evidence also indicates that vote buying can lower citizens' trust in electoral institutions. The size of that association varies with personal anti-vote-buying norms and on whether local contexts have become normatively desensitized to patronage.[3] What shields ordinary and low-income citizens from clientelist capture? When do voters refuse cash handouts, or defect from them at the ballot box? Both questions are central in comparative political sociology and development studies.[4]

Within this comparative agenda, gender, associational density, and local public goods intersect. The patterns are complex and often counterintuitive. Recent survey-experimental evidence from Southeast Asia shows that expectations of clientelist largesse can penalize women candidates.[5] Neighborhood social density also shapes whether politicians supply collective community benefits or atomized private handouts.[6] Clientelism is not purely an indigent phenomenon. A survey experiment in Lebanon shows that middle-class and cross-class strata also engage in transactional exchange, depending on institutional alternatives,[7–9] and vote buying and local public goods provision can operate as strategic substitutes or as complements in decentralizing polities.[7–9] Tension peaks in post-authoritarian Indonesia and the Philippines. There, simultaneous legislative and decentralized local executive elections ('Pilkada' and '*Pilkades*' in Indonesia; municipal and 'barangay' races in the Philippines) confront candidates with acute dilemmas: anti-corruption commitments pull one way, and voter expectations of material distribution pull the other.[10] Customary and religious institutions deeply

mediate ethnic and communal clientelism beyond election day across Indonesian provinces and districts.[11] Parties and informal brokerage networks, for their part, mediate welfare and public health access at the grassroots.[12–14]

One question remains unresolved. What role do grassroots women's civic–religious networks play in sustaining or resisting electoral clientelism? In Muslim-majority Indonesia, large numbers of women take part regularly in four kinds of groups: non-formal Islamic prayer and study circles ('*Majelis Taklim*', '*Kelompok Pengajian*', and '*Yasinan*'), the autonomous women's wings of mass Islamic organizations ('Muslimat' and 'Fatayat' Nahdlatul Ulama; 'Aisyiyah' Muhammadiyah), neighborhood rotating-savings and mutual-aid groups ('*Dasa Wisma*' and '*arisan*'), and village family-welfare associations ('*Pemberdayaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga*', PKK). Comparable faith-civic women's associations, parish mutual-aid circles, and neighborhood committees anchor communal life across Philippine barangays and Latin American municipalities. Existing scholarship splits into two polarized camps. One describes dense feminized religious and neighborhood associations as low-cost brokerage infrastructures. On this view they facilitate relational vote buying by wrapping cash envelopes in idioms of pious charity ('*sedekah*') and communal gratitude. The rival camp celebrates women's civic–religious associations as autonomous moral communities that foster civic skill-building, deliberative accountability, and resistance to money politics. Few prior studies combine cross-national multilevel data, subnational spatial econometrics, paired voter-and-broker microdata, and set-theoretic configurational synthesis. These competing claims have therefore rarely been reconciled empirically.

1.2. Theoretical literature: the dual-edged moral economy of gendered civic–religious associationalism

We reconcile these competing perspectives by theorizing grassroots women's civic–religious networks as 'dual-edged moral-economy arenas'. Their electoral consequences depend on associational brokerage, moral framing, ballot secrecy, and autonomous material institutions. Network-analytic studies of Philippine barangays show that campaign brokers draw on multiplex social ties and intrinsic norms of interpersonal reciprocity to reduce opportunistic voter defection, even when formal ballot monitoring is imperfect.[2,15] Brokering is not confined to parties. In weak-party democracies, civil-society leaders and street-level intermediaries can become 'brokering' conduits for particularistic favors.[16] Religion works similarly. Its role in electoral politics runs through religious practice and communal belonging as well as belief.[17] A counterpoint comes from comparative research on Islamic religious behaviors: among Muslims in Europe and North America, mosque attendance is associated with civic organizational membership and political participation, and the same may hold for women's study groups.[18] Shared identity ties also matter. Experimental work on sectarian and communal politics shows that they reach beyond material clientelism, into symbolic solidarity.[19]

Anthropological and political-economy theories of the 'moral economy' stress one point. Material transfers during elections are never interpreted in a normative vacuum. A recent experimental study in sub-Saharan Africa confirms that communal inclusion and historical residency shape norms of mutual obligation within local moral economies.[20] Research on the Philippines also confirms that political loyalty is often rationalized through culturally embedded idioms of debt of gratitude ('*utang na loob*') and reciprocal care.[21] In Indonesia, psychological and behavioral research indicates that voters who regard vote-selling as unethical, or who have higher self-control, are less tempted to sell their votes, although many who condemn vote buying still accept money.[22,23] Moral rejection alone is not enough. Normative rejection of bribery cannot translate into behavioral resistance if voters fear surveillance or retaliation. Experimental evidence indicates that exposure to vote buying can itself erode citizens' confidence in the secrecy of the ballot, unless institutional safeguards reassure voters that brokers cannot observe individual choices.[24] Field and survey experiments in Africa, South Asia, and Latin America reveal that anti-vote-buying campaigns, social-status dynamics, and citizen evaluations of clientelism depend on whether handouts are perceived as demeaning bribes or caring communal redistribution.[25–27] When candidates cross moral boundaries or rely on coercive patronage, clientelism frequently backfires. It can provoke electoral retaliation.[28] It can depress institutional trust, although it does not necessarily reduce turnout.[29] It also interacts with citizens' evaluations of gender balance, meritocracy, and civic duty to vote.[30,31]

Taken together, these strands yield a precise theoretical expectation, which we term the 'Dual-Edged Associational Paradox.' Consider Edge 1 (Instrumental Brokerage Attraction). Women manage daily household provisioning and convene regularly in *Majelis Taklim*, *Dasa Wisma*, and PKK meetings. Grassroots campaign teams therefore actively recruit female neighborhood coordinators ('*korlap*') from inside these associations, and they target organizational rosters with cash envelopes and *sembako*. Unconditional membership in religious or women's associations increases exposure to campaign handouts. It also subjects members to cross-pressuring norms of neighborly politeness. We therefore expect that associational membership alone need not raise resistance, so that its unconditional association with resistance may be null. Edge 2 (Conditional Moral-Economy Shield and Tactical Defection) works differently. Civic–religious participation is coupled with autonomous anti-bribery moral framing (recognizing envelopes as illicit bribes rather than pious *sedekah*), confidence in ballot secrecy, independent religious economic endowments ('*waqf*' and women's '*Baitul Maal wat Tamwil*' [BMT] micro-cooperatives), and participatory village public-goods institutions ('*Musrenbang*'). Under these conditions, we expect women's networks to support principled refusal and tactical ballot-box defection. Women take unsolicited handouts to preserve neighborhood harmony. They still vote autonomously, according to programmatic conscience.

1.3. Gendered decentralization, spatial contagion, and integrative research questions

Placing this two-sided mechanism within decentralizing democracies requires attention to gendered participation inequalities, programmatic public-goods alternatives, and subnational spatial interdependence. Recent rural South Asian evidence shows marked gender differences in electoral participation, shaped by marital status and women's social networks.[32,33] Gender scholarship adds a comparative finding: the public expects women candidates to be more supportive of campaign-finance reform,[34] and women voters respond to women party leaders.[35] Structure matters too. Clientelism thrives where state governance fails to deliver predictable, rule-bound public goods and

social protection.[36] Theoretical and empirical work demonstrates that voters reward programmatic public goods very differently from discretionary welfare handouts.[37] Electing grassroots brokers can reshape urban public-goods delivery.[38] Coercive or monopolistic patronage machines suppress democratic autonomy where civic counter-organizations are weak or asymmetric.[39,40] Geography matters as well. Neither patronage machines nor religious–civic counter-institutions stop at administrative district borders. Historical religious land endowments (*waqf*), Islamic cooperative finance networks (BMT), and pluralist civic norms may diffuse across contiguous subnational jurisdictions through preacher circuits, women's federation chapters, and cross-district market ties.

This theoretical framework guides our study. We address three integrative mixed-methods research questions across four empirical tiers. (RQ1: Multilevel Norms and Subnational Spatial Contagion) Across decentralizing democracies and contiguous Indonesian districts, how do gendered anti-vote-buying moral norms and contextual patronage saturation shape electoral trust, and to what extent do autonomous religious endowments (*waqf*) and women's/Islamic micro-cooperatives (BMT) generate positive spatial spillovers against patronage-machine dominance? (RQ2: Dyadic Micro-Mechanisms of Targeting vs. Resistance) Consider the voter–broker interface in decentralized Indonesia and the Philippines. Women's civic–religious embeddedness attracts handout targeting. It also enables conscience-based ballot-box defection, deliberative village budgeting, and resistance to machine candidates. How does this play out across the Q10–Q90 autonomy distribution? (RQ3: Configurational Case Synthesis) Across 28 subnational and local electoral regimes, which asymmetric combinations of women's civic–religious networks, moral-economy autonomy, ballot secrecy, autonomous religious endowments, and programmatic public goods are necessary and sufficient for high voter resistance versus clientelist capture?

2. Methods

2.1. Four-tier public data provenance and on-ingest PII sanitization

We want complete empirical transparency. No synthetic or simulated observations are used. To that end, we assemble nine peer-reviewed open-access replication archives from the Harvard Dataverse REST API, comprising exactly 325,362 raw records (22.53 MB), and SHA-256 checksums used to check the integrity of these files are recorded in our reproducibility manifest. Tier 1 combines pooled AmericasBarometer multilevel survey microdata with a randomized Mexican online survey vignette experiment.[3] The survey microdata cover 212,561 respondents across 3,540 subnational primary sampling units in 33 polities, 2004–2018. The experiment involved N = 1,590 consenting adult citizens (Harvard Dataverse doi:10.7910/DVN/HVSEBL). Tier 2 integrates the Indonesian village and citizen-survey archive of Bazzi, Koehler-Derrick, and Marx (doi:10.7910/DVN/OY4SM9). It holds 55,623 total village records, of which 52,095 have complete geospatial coordinates and legislative vote shares across 211 contiguous districts, plus 1,447 and 48,545 citizen religiosity survey records. We add 675 decentralized Indonesian local executive ('Pilkada') coalition records (doi:10.7910/DVN/RWMAEJ).

Tier 3 triangulates five dyadic voter, broker, and social-network datasets. They come from the two flagship decentralizing democracies of Southeast Asia. Tier 3A & 3B pairs the Central Java Voter Survey of Hicken, Aspinall, Weiss, and Muhtadi (N = 383 voters, 535 retained analytical variables) with their Campaign Broker ('*Tim Sukses*') Survey. The broker survey has N = 332 valid interviewed brokers after 454 blank SPSS padding rows were removed, as documented in the original replication script (doi:10.7910/DVN/SCXPHI).[1] Tier 3C: rural South Sulawesi village governance and bribery-refusal microdata from Gowa Regency (N = 200; doi:10.7910/DVN/CLU5YP). Tier 3D & 3E uses the Philippine barangay social-network and reciprocity survey of Ravanilla, Haim, and Hicken (N = 900: 701 voters and 199 brokers; doi:10.7910/DVN/UTRXT7).[2] That survey is paired with the de-identified voter monitoring and enforcement dataset of Ravanilla and Hicken (N = 659 total, 507 complete cases across 61 barangays; doi:10.7910/DVN/QNSWRO).[4] We followed the Declaration of Helsinki and the STROBE reporting guideline. Our ingestion pipeline automatically scrubbed all direct personal identifiers before analysis, and it dropped 25 PII columns in Tier 3A, 14 PII columns in Tier 3B, and respondent names in Tier 3C (names, street addresses, informant names, candidate/broker names, and telephone numbers). Irreversible one-way SHA-256 locality cluster hashes were also generated.

2.2. Multilevel modeling and maximum-likelihood spatial Durbin econometrics (SAR and SDM)

In Tier 1, we estimate country fixed-effects models. They cover linear probability and continuous outcomes. Variance-covariance matrices are clustered across 3,540 subnational primary sampling units (PSUs), which accounts for intra-municipal correlation in broker targeting and collective moral norms. Electoral trust runs from 0 to 100. Personal anti-vote-buying moral norms, constructed from AmericasBarometer items clien4, clien4a, and clien4b, run from 0 (strong approval of vote buying) to 1 (unconditional moral rejection). We add PSU-level contextual norm means. The models also carry the randomized vignette interaction in Mexico, which contrasts clientelist-saturated with unsaturated environments.

Tier 2 asks whether religious–civic institutional autonomy diffuses spatially across decentralized Indonesian jurisdictions. To test this, we build a row-standardized k = 6 nearest-neighbor Haversine spatial weight matrix W from the geographic centroids (longitude, latitude) of 211 contiguous Indonesian districts, which together aggregate 52,095 villages, following recent advances in spatial weight matrix parameterization and spatial econometrics.[41–43] Global spatial autocorrelation is evaluated with Moran's I. The reference is 4,999 Monte Carlo random permutations. Local Indicators of Spatial Association (LISA) supply the quadrant classifications (High–High, Low–Low, High–Low, and Low–High). Next, we estimate two models by maximum likelihood: the Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) model, $y = \rho Wy + X\beta + \varepsilon$, and the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM), $y = \rho Wy + X\beta + WX\theta + \varepsilon$. Both rely on exact eigenvalue log-determinants $\log|I_n - \rho W|$. Point coefficients in spatial lag models do not equal marginal effects, because feedback loops pass through $(I_n - \rho W)^{-1}$. For this reason we compute exact LeSage–Pace Average Direct Effects (the diagonal trace of $S_r(W) = (I_n - \rho W)^{-1}(I_n \beta_r + W\theta_r)$), Average Spatial Spillover (Indirect) Effects (off-diagonal row sums), and Average Total Effects. Standard errors come from 350 multivariate normal draws from the asymptotic ML information matrix. The Tier 2 outcome is the combined PKB and PAN vote

share, or its ratio to the Golkar vote share, so Tier 2 describes the geography of party votes and does not measure vote buying or voter resistance directly. Only 350 draws are used for the simulated standard errors, so the spillover standard errors are approximate, and no sensitivity analysis with alternative spatial weights is reported.

Fitting both SAR and SDM specifications side by side gives a useful diagnostic against omitted, spatially correlated confounders.[41,42,44,45] The SAR specification captures endogenous electoral contagion. Pluralist civic-Islamic party mobilization in district i directly encourages neighboring voters and religious federations in contiguous district j. The channels are cross-border preaching networks, regional media markets, and shared provincial party slates. The Spatial Durbin specification adds spatially lagged institutional endowments (WXθ). In substantive terms, W × BMT micro-cooperative density and W × *waqf* endowment fraction ask whether autonomous community religious assets in neighboring districts generate cross-jurisdictional institutional externalities. Two examples fit. Regional BMT cooperative federations may extend micro-credit branches across adjacent regencies, and major *pesantren* and *waqf* complexes may also train female religious educators ('*ustadzah*' and '*mubalighat*') who later lead *Majelis Taklim* study circles in surrounding districts.

2.3. Doubly robust AIPW, list-experiment diagnostics, and continuous RIF quantile regressions

Citizen participation in *Majelis Taklim*, *Dasa Wisma*, PKK, rural community associations, and formal barangay networks is non-randomly selected on gender, age, education, income, and network degree. Naive OLS comparisons therefore risk confounding. In Tier 3, we estimate counterfactual Average Treatment Effects (ATEs) with Doubly Robust Augmented Inverse Probability Weighting (AIPW). The propensity score models use iteratively reweighted least-squares (IRLS) and are trimmed to [0.05, 0.95], a common choice that limits extreme-weight variance inflation.[46,47] They are combined with treatment-specific outcome regressions. AIPW estimators stay consistent when either the propensity model or the conditional outcome model is correctly specified. For every causal contrast, we audit pre- versus post-weighting Standardized Mean Differences (requiring post-IPW max |SMD| < 0.10). We also compute VanderWeele E-values. An E-value gives the minimum risk-ratio association that an unmeasured confounder would need with both treatment and outcome to nullify the point estimate,[48] and it matches modern sensitivity standards for unmeasured confounding.[48] In Central Java, a further comparison sets direct cash-envelope self-reports (Q40) against an embedded randomized list experiment (EKSPERIMEN_1: Q14_B four-item list including cash/*sembako* envelopes minus Q14_A three-item control list). This comparison quantifies social-desirability bias.

Conditional means say little about distributional heterogeneity. To examine it, from the most clientelism-vulnerable lower tail (Q10) to the most autonomous upper tail (Q90), we estimate Firpo–Fortin–Lemieux Recentered Influence Function (RIF) unconditional quantile regressions:[49] RIF(y; q_τ, F_Y) = q_τ + (τ − I(y < q_τ)) / $f_Y(q_\tau)$. The density $f_Y(q_\tau)$ comes from Gaussian kernel estimation, and standard errors use the HC3 heteroskedasticity correction. One methodological precaution matters here. Applying RIF to coarse discrete sum scores (e.g., 0, 25, 50, 75, 100) produces degenerate zero-variance estimates whenever upper quantiles hit the discrete ceiling ($q_{0.75}$ = 100). We therefore estimate RIF strictly on continuous outcomes. These are district civic-Islamic electoral shares (%) across 211 Indonesian districts, and a continuous standardized multi-indicator Electoral Autonomy Index (mean 50, SD 15) across 520 Philippine barangay voters. Both give smooth interior densities across all five quantiles (Q10, Q25, Q50, Q75, and Q90). The Tier 3 contrasts use mixed-gender samples (for example, N = 383 voters of whom 51.44% are women), and no contrast is estimated for women only or with an interaction between network membership and bribe recognition.

2.4. Metric-harmonized four-value fuzzy-set QCA and mixed-methods integration

Tier 4 links variable-oriented causal inference[50–53] with case-oriented configurational methodology.[50–53] We build a 28-regime comparative matrix. It spans four empirical blocks. The first holds eight Central Java voter strata, cross-classified by dual civic–religious embeddedness, anti-bribery moral framing, and household income (R01–R08). The second covers eight major Indonesian provincial spatial corridors, which aggregate village endowments and electoral ratios (R09–R16). Four rural Gowa village governance regimes form the third, cross-classified by women's community participation and *Musrenbang* deliberation (R17–R20). The last has eight anonymized Philippine barangays spanning the spectrum of machine defection (R21–R28). Raw indicators come from distinct survey instruments. Pooling unstandardized scores would therefore create artificial shifts between blocks, so each block is harmonized linearly onto [0.15, 0.90]. Exact empirical rank and interval proportionality stay intact within every instrument. Next, six four-value fuzzy sets are calibrated (0.00 = fully out below Q20; 0.33 = more out than in [Q20–Q50); 0.67 = more in than out [Q50–Q80); 1.00 = fully in at or above Q80). The conditions are WOMEN_CIVIC_RELIG (anchors 0.435, 0.629, 0.875), MORAL_AUTONOMY (0.296, 0.525, 0.869), BALLOT_SECRECY (0.278, 0.569, 0.840), RELIG_ENDOW_AUTO (0.219, 0.531, 0.862), PROG_PUBLIC_GOODS (0.150, 0.583, 0.900), and VOTER_RESISTANCE (0.268, 0.556, 0.822). The matrix combines cases of different kinds (voter strata, provincial corridors, village regimes, and barangays), and MORAL_AUTONOMY and VOTER_RESISTANCE may overlap with the bribe-recognition treatment and the conscience-defection outcome of Tier 3 (Table 3), so the fsQCA is an organizing synthesis of the earlier tiers and not an independent test.


Following established QCA conventions,[52,54,55] we test single-condition necessity against a strict 0.90 consistency threshold. Configurational sufficiency needs raw consistency ≥ 0.80 together with Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency (PRI) ≥ 0.70, computed as ($\sum \min(X_i, Y_i) - \sum \min(X_i, Y_i, 1 - Y_i)$) / ($\sum X_i - \sum \min(X_i, Y_i, 1 - Y_i)$). Why audit it? Because it prevents a subset fallacy. One ambiguous conjunction can look sufficient for both VOTER_RESISTANCE and its negation (~VOTER_RESISTANCE), and the PRI screens that out. Causal relations in political sociology are fundamentally asymmetric. The institutional conditions that insulate voters against clientelism are not simple mirror images of the conditions that lock neighborhoods into patronage compliance. We minimize configurations separately for High Voter Resistance and for Clientelist Capture. Finally, we follow recent calls for intersectional and integrative

mixed-methods research.[56–58] Quantitative multilevel/spatial estimates, dyadic voter–broker microdata, and configurational pathways are synthesized in a formal Joint Display (Table 7), which classifies Confirming, Discordant, and Expanding Meta-Inferences.


3. Results

3.1. Cross-national multilevel moral norms and contextual patronage desensitization (Tier 1)

Table 1 and Figure 1 report the Tier 1 benchmarks. They are cross-national, multilevel, and experimental, and they cover decentralizing democracies. The AmericasBarometer sample has 91,995 respondents with direct clientelism measures in 33 polities. Among them, 10.57% of women report a direct vote-buying offer, compared with 12.83% of men (t = −10.68, p < 0.0001), a gap that the data describe but do not explain; targeting of male household heads by male brokers is one possible explanation that the study does not test. The 2018 normative module (N = 8,383 nested in 3,540 municipal PSUs) differs. Women endorse stronger anti-vote-buying moral norms than men, although the difference is small (0.6807 vs. 0.6587 on the 0–1 rejection scale, a gap of 0.022; Welch t = 3.58, p = 0.00035). A variance decomposition shows that 10.44% of all variation in anti-bribery moral norms clusters at the local municipal/PSU neighborhood level (intra-PSU share = 0.1044). That share is five times the country-level variance in electoral trust (0.0202), although the two quantities refer to different outcomes and are not strictly comparable. The result suggests that the moral economy of clientelism has an important subnational and neighborhood component.



Gender Gap: Women Anti-VB Norm = 0.681 vs. Men = 0.659 (t = 3.58, p = 0.00035); Direct Handout Targeting: Women = 10.57% vs. Men = 12.83%.



Anti-VB Moral Norm main slope = −11.14 (p = 0.0082); Vote buying erodes trust sharply where clientelism is NOT yet normalized.

Figure 1. Cross-national multilevel clientelism exposure and gendered anti-bribery moral norms across 33 AmericasBarometer polities (Panel A: N = 212,561; 3,540 PSUs) paired with post-treatment electoral trust across randomized experimental arms in the Mexican contextual saturation vignette experiment (Panel B: N = 1,590; unsaturated trust shock Δ = −4.34 points, p = 0.0202).

Table 1, Panel A and Figure 1A give PSU-clustered country fixed-effects regressions. Direct personal vote-buying offers (−3.37 points, SE = 0.47, t = −7.11, p = 1.39×10^{-12}) and indirect neighborhood vote buying (−5.61 points, SE = 1.84, p = 0.0024) are both associated with lower trust in elections. Personal anti-vote-buying norms (−3.58 points, p = 0.0254) and PSU-level collective anti-bribery norms (−13.19 points, p = 0.0118) also carry negative main slopes on electoral trust. This is broadly consistent with Cohen, Noh, and Zechmeister (2025),[3] who report modest, context-dependent links between vote buying, norms, and trust. Principled citizens and normatively vigilant neighborhoods may behave as 'critical citizens', judging clientelism-tainted electoral processes more stringently than normatively permissive voters do. The randomized Mexican vignette experiment (N = 1,590; Table 1, Panel B; Figure 1B) points to the role of patronage saturation. Respondents in pure control report a mean electoral trust of 55.16. In an unsaturated civic context, where respondents have not routinely normalized election bribery, exposure to a vote-buying vignette is followed by a −4.34-point drop in electoral trust relative to control (50.82, t = −2.33, p = 0.0202). In clientelist-saturated contexts, vote-buying stories are already commonplace. There the vignette has no detectable effect (55.32, p = 0.9410), which is consistent with normative desensitization. The difference between the two vignette arms is −4.50 points (50.82 vs. 55.32); the interaction between vignette and context was not tested directly, so this contrast is descriptive.

Table 1. Cross-National Multilevel Clientelism & Anti-Vote-Buying Moral Norms Across 33 Polities (AmericasBarometer, N = 212,561; 3,540 PSUs) and Randomized Contextual Saturation Experiment (Mexico, N = 1,590).

Analytical Panel / Predictor or Experimental Arm	Sample / Scope	Estimate / Mean	Cluster / HC3 SE	Test Stat (t)	p-Value & Substantive Interpretation
Panel A: Pooled Multilevel Electoral Trust & Gendered Norms (33 Polities, 3,540 Municipal PSUs)					
Gender Gap in Anti-Vote-Buying Moral Norm (Women vs. Men)	N = 8,383 (2018)	0.6807 vs. 0.6587	0.0062	+3.58	p = 0.00035 (Women hold stricter anti-bribery norms)
Gender Gap in Direct Cash/Gift Targeting (Women vs. Men)	N = 91,995 (2010–14)	10.57% vs. 12.83%	0.21%	−10.68	p < 0.0001 (Lower direct individual cash targeting of women)
Direct Vote-Buying Offer → Electoral Trust (0–100)	N = 91,995, Country FE	−3.37 pts	0.47	−7.11	p = 1.39×10^{-12} (Direct offers are associated with lower electoral trust)
Neighborhood Vote Buying → Electoral Trust (0–100)	N = 8,383, Country FE	−5.61 pts	1.84	−3.05	p = 0.0024 (Neighborhood vote buying is associated with lower trust)
Personal Anti-VB Moral Norm → Electoral Trust (Critical Citizen)	N = 8,383, PSU Clust.	−3.58 pts	1.60	−2.24	p = 0.0254 (Norm-holders judge tainted polls critically)
PSU Collective Moral Norm (ICC = 10.44%) → Electoral Trust	3,540 PSUs, Country FE	−13.19 pts	5.22	−2.53	p = 0.0118 (Neighborhood norm clustering & vigilance)
Panel B: Randomized Vote-Buying Vignette Experiment (Mexico, N = 1,590 Consenting Adult Citizens)					
Pure Control Arm (No Vote-Buying Vignette)	n = 808	55.16 / 100	1.13	Ref.	Baseline post-treatment electoral trust benchmark
VB Vignette in Clientelist-Saturated Context (EXP1C = 1)	n = 335	55.32 / 100	1.86	+0.07	p = 0.9410 (Consistent with normative desensitization under chronic patronage)
VB Vignette in Unsaturated Civic Context (EXP1C ≠ 1)	n = 447	50.82 / 100	1.48	−2.33	p = 0.0202 (Δ = −4.34 pts trust shock vs. Control)
Experimental Anti-VB Moral Norm Slope (0–1 Scale)	N = 1,590, HC3 OLS	−11.14 pts	4.21	−2.65	p = 0.0082 (Consistent with critical-citizen moral vigilance)

Source: Author's calculations from Harvard Dataverse doi:10.7910/DVN/HVSEBL.[3] Multilevel OLS models absorb country fixed effects with standard errors clustered across 3,540 subnational primary sampling units (PSUs). Abbreviations: SE, standard error; HC3, heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error; PSU, primary sampling unit; pp, percentage points. The gap in direct targeting is women minus men. The control variables, survey weights and number of waves of the Panel A models are not reported.

3.2. Subnational spatial contagion of religious–civic endowments across Indonesian districts (Tier 2)

The analysis now shifts from cross-national multilevel patterns to subnational geospatial structure. Table 2 and Figure 2 cover 52,095 Indonesian villages aggregated across 211 contiguous districts (mean k = 6 nearest-neighbor centroid distance = 98.6 km). In the paired national religiosity archive (48,545 Indonesian citizens), women show significantly higher communal religious commitment than men (0.4082 vs. 0.3752 z-score, Welch t = 7.45, p = 9.68×10^{-14}). Their grassroots engagement is high as well. Of the women, 27.79% always attend routine *pengajian* prayer circles, and 83.53% always contribute to moral-economy *zakat* giving. Electoral competition looks different. Across 675 decentralized Pilkada local executive elections (averaging 6.37 candidate pairs per race), 28.07% of tickets form cross-religious pluralist coalitions. These tickets win 17.84% of multi-candidate contests. Competitive incentives for grassroots coalition-building are intense.

Global Moran's I permutation tests (4,999 draws; Table 2, Panel A) reject spatial independence across the Indonesian archipelago. Pluralist civic-Islamic associational party voting is strongly clustered. Its Global Moran's I is 0.4975 (z = 13.50, p = 0.0002, the smallest value attainable with 4,999 permutations), a large positive spatial autocorrelation. This voting is the combined PKB + PAN share, historically associated with Nahdlatul Ulama's Muslimat/Fatayat women's networks and Muhammadiyah's 'Aisyiyah chapters. It splits the archipelago into 54 High–High civic-associational districts and 105 Low–Low machine-dominant districts (Figure 2A). Most High–High districts lie along East and Central Java's Nahdliyin-Mataraman corridor, with a few pockets in Sumatra/Sulawesi. Autonomous religious–civic infrastructure combines *waqf* religious land fraction, *Baitul*


Maal wat Tamwil [BMT] Islamic micro-cooperatives, *pesantren*/*madrasa* density, and mosques per capita, and it clusters just as strongly in space (Moran's I = 0.5079, z = 13.82, p = 0.0002). So does patronage-machine Golkar voting (Moran's I = 0.3453, z = 9.58, p = 0.0002).

Maximum-Likelihood SAR and Spatial Durbin (SDM) decompositions (Table 2, Panel B; Figure 2B) are consistent with cross-district spillovers and not only demographic sorting, although spatial dependence of this kind can also reflect shared unobserved context. District schooling, nighttime-lights economic development, and public health infrastructure are held constant. The spatial autoregressive parameter then reaches ρ = 0.6325 (z = 10.53, $p < 1 \times 10^{-16}$) in ML-SAR. In the anti-machine ML-SDM specification it is ρ = 0.5829 (z = 8.49, $p < 1 \times 10^{-16}$). In the SAR model, a one-standard-deviation increase in autonomous village *waqf* land endowments is associated with a +1.01 pp Direct Effect (p = 0.0118), a +1.49 pp Spatial Spillover Effect into neighboring districts (p = 0.0383), and a +2.50 pp Total Spatial Impact (p = 0.0210) on civic-Islamic electoral strength. The Spatial Durbin model of civic-Islamic share, which also includes neighbors' *waqf* endowments, gives a direct effect of +0.96 pp (p = 0.0182), a spillover of +0.06 ± 1.97 pp, and a total impact of +1.02 ± 2.18 pp, so the *waqf* spillover is sensitive to the specification (Table 2). The Spatial Durbin model of the programmatic–pluralist versus Golkar patronage-machine ratio gives a further result. BMT women's and grassroots Islamic micro-cooperative density is associated with a +5.96 pp Total Spatial Impact (SE = 2.91, z = 2.05, p = 0.0401). Most of this is a +4.98 pp cross-border spillover (p = 0.0738, not significant at the 5% level). Diffusion of cooperative savings federations across contiguous subnational markets is one possible explanation that the data do not test.

Table 2. Subnational Indonesian Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran's I, 4,999 Permutations) and Maximum-Likelihood SAR / Spatial Durbin (SDM) Direct, Spillover, and Total Impacts Across 211 Contiguous Districts (52,095 Villages).

Spatial Diagnostic / Estimator & Covariate	Spatial Parameter / Scope	Direct Impact (Est ± SE)	Spatial Spillover (Est ± SE)	Total Impact (Est ± SE)	p-Value & LISA / Contagion Interpretation
Panel A: Global & Local Moran's I Spatial Clustering (k = 6 Haversine Weights; Mean NN = 98.6 km)					
Civic-Islamic Associational Vote Share (PKB + PAN %)	I = 0.4975	HH = 54 dist.	LL = 105 dist.	HL/LH = 30/22	z = 13.50, p = 0.0002 (Strong regional civic corridors)
Autonomous Religious–Civic Infrastructure Index (z)	I = 0.5079	HH = 76 dist.	LL = 96 dist.	HL/LH = 18/21	z = 13.82, p = 0.0002 (Contiguous *waqf*/BMT/*pesantren* belts)
Patronage-Machine Party Vote Share (Golkar %)	I = 0.3453	HH = 66 dist.	LL = 81 dist.	HL/LH = 22/42	z = 9.58, p = 0.0002 (Spatial machine enclaves)
Panel B: ML Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) & Spatial Durbin (SDM) Marginal Impacts (350 Monte Carlo Draws)					
ML-SAR on Civic-Islamic Share: Spatial Lag ρ	ρ = 0.6325 (SE 0.060)	LogLik = −334.91	AIC = 687.82	N = 211 districts	z = 10.53, $p < 1 \times 10^{-16}$ (Endogenous spatial diffusion)
ML-SAR: Autonomous *Waqf* Land Endowment (+1 SD)	Civic-Islamic Share (%)	+1.01 ± 0.40 pp	+1.49 ± 0.72 pp	+2.50 ± 1.08 pp	Direct p = 0.012; Spillover p = 0.038; Total p = 0.021
ML-SDM on Civic-Islamic Share: *Waqf* Direct Effect	ρ = 0.6094 (z = 9.32)	+0.96 ± 0.41 pp	+0.06 ± 1.97 pp	+1.02 ± 2.18 pp	Direct p = 0.0182 (Local institutional anchor)
ML-SDM on Pluralist vs. Machine Ratio: Spatial Lag ρ	ρ = 0.5829 (SE 0.069)	LogLik = −460.08	AIC = 950.17	N = 211 districts	z = 8.49, $p < 1 \times 10^{-16}$ (Anti-machine spatial contagion)
ML-SDM: BMT Women's/Islamic Micro-Coop (+1 SD)	Pluralist Civic Ratio (%)	+0.98 ± 0.79 pp	+4.98 ± 2.79 pp	+5.96 ± 2.91 pp	Spillover p = 0.074; Total p = 0.0401 (Cross-district diffusion; spillover not significant at 5%)

Source: Author's spatial econometric calculations from Harvard Dataverse doi:10.7910/DVN/OY4SM9 (52,095 villages with complete coordinates and KPU vote shares). Controls include pesantren/madrasa *density, mean schooling, nighttime lights, and public health facility access. Abbreviations: ML, maximum likelihood; SAR, spatial autoregressive model; SDM, spatial Durbin model; LISA, local indicators of spatial association; HH, High–High; LL, Low–Low; HL/LH, High–Low/Low–High; AIC, Akaike information criterion. Impacts are average direct, spillover, and total impacts with standard errors from 350 simulated draws. A permutation p of 0.0002 is the smallest value attainable with 4,999 permutations. The outcome is the PKB + PAN vote share (SAR and the first SDM row) or its ratio to the Golkar vote share (second SDM model).*






Figure 2. Subnational geospatial clustering of civic-Islamic associational voting across 211 contiguous Indonesian districts aggregating 52,095 villages (Panel A: Local Moran's I LISA map; Global Moran's I = 0.4975, z = 13.50, p = 0.0002) and Maximum-Likelihood SAR/SDM Direct, Spatial Spillover, and Total Marginal Impacts of *waqf* endowments (SAR total impact +2.50 pp, p = 0.0210) and BMT women's/Islamic micro-cooperatives (SDM total impact +5.96 pp, p = 0.0401) (Panel B).

3.3. Resolving the dual-edged associational paradox: voters, brokers, and distributional RIF profiles (Tier 3)


Tables 3, 4, and 5 alongside Figures 3 and 4 unpack the micro-foundations of voter targeting, moral boundary-drawing, and ballot-box resistance across Indonesia and the Philippines. Start with Central Java (N = 383 voters: 51.44% women). Women form much of the organizational base of neighborhood civic–religious life there (Table 5; Figure 3A). Among them, 47.72% are active participants in *Majelis Taklim*, *pengajian*, or *yasinan* prayer groups (vs. 37.10% of men). *Dasa Wisma* rotating-savings groups are more common still: 52.79% are active. PKK community welfare associations draw 32.49% of women, compared with just 1.08% of men, a 30-to-1 gender ratio. Last, 40.10% show combined civic–religious embeddedness (simultaneous religious and *Dasa Wisma*/PKK participation), nearly double men's 20.97%. Next comes our randomized list experiment (EKSPERIMEN_1). Its results can be set against direct self-reports. The list experiment estimates 37.93% (SE = 8.06%) cash/food envelope receipt (34.31% among women; 40.72% among men), only +3.20 pp above direct personal self-reports (34.73%; 53.26% including

household-level envelopes). That gap is small relative to the standard error of the list estimate, so the list experiment is too imprecise to show whether social-desirability bias is low.

Why does dense civic–religious participation not automatically eliminate envelope acceptance? Our Doubly Robust AIPW estimates (Table 3; Figure 3B, where post-IPW covariate imbalance stays at or below max |SMD| = 0.060 across all models) are consistent with both edges of the Dual-Edged Associational Paradox, although they are not a direct test of it. On Edge 1, affiliation with mass religious-civic organizations (NU/Muhammadiyah), estimated for all 383 voters and not for women alone, was associated with +12.55 percentage points higher campaign cash-envelope targeting (SE = 5.12, z = 2.45, p = 0.0142, E-value = 1.83). The paired Central Java Broker Survey (N = 332 valid *tim sukses* operatives; Table 5) offers a possible explanation. Men make up 86.75% of campaign brokers. Women are the other 13.25% (n = 44). They are heavily embedded inside women's grassroots circles: 50.00% are active *Majelis Taklim* participants, 65.91% are active in *Dasa Wisma*, and 47.73% are active in PKK. Verbatim open-ended broker roster entries name '*PENGAJIAN*', '*MAJELIS TAKLIM*', '*JAMAAH*', and 'PKK'. Of the female brokers, 86.36% distributed envelopes. *Majelis Taklim* members also report slightly higher social embarrassment when refusing neighborly brokers (24.7% vs. 15.7%). Unconditional civic–religious membership alone, by contrast, shows a statistically null association with overall voter resistance (AIPW ATE = +0.85 points, p = 0.7739).

On Edge 2, however, the picture changes. Some voters reject pious gift-laundering idioms and classify campaign envelopes as illicit bribes rather than charitable gratitude. For them, conscience-based ballot-box defection is higher by +13.53 percentage points (AIPW z = 2.43, p = 0.0151, E-value = 1.90). Such defection means accepting household envelopes to avoid interpersonal friction while voting purely by programmatic preference or personal conscience. A dyadic comparison of voters and brokers points to weak enforcement of patronage compliance. Voters see it: 72.32% of those in Central Java recognize that nothing happens if they defect at the ballot box after taking cash. Brokers agree. Some 79.22% of *tim sukses* brokers independently admit 'None, we could not do anything' when a voter defects. Looking ahead, 80.42% of grassroots brokers (77.27% of female brokers and 80.90% of male brokers) say they would rather work for a non-wealthy candidate with a track record of delivering village public programs (Candidate B) than for a wealthy patron distributing cash envelopes (Candidate A).

Evidence from rural South Sulawesi and from Philippine barangays shows how deliberative village institutions and formal civic–religious networks may turn this latent autonomy into behavioral resistance. Start with rural Gowa (N = 200, 64.0% Muslim women). There, 88.28% of women directly refuse bribery demands. Another 72.00% actively detect clientelist mistargeting in village social-assistance lists. The Doubly Robust AIPW estimate for grassroots civic-community participation is a +34.22 pp higher rate of active citizen proposal-making in village *Musrenbang* planning (z = 5.76, p = 8.17×10^{-09}, E-value = 3.34). Philippine barangays (N = 507) form the second case, and 64.62% of poor voters there received cash offers. Formal civic–religious network membership is associated with +10.12 pp higher actual electoral defection against the vote-buying machine ('Team A') in AIPW (p = 0.0417, E-value = 1.73). Barangay fixed-effects models give +13.14 pp per network tie (p = 0.0396; Table 4). Extreme household poverty weakens this shield by −13.20 pp (p = 0.084).[4] Strictly continuous RIF quantile regressions (Table 4; Figure 4) show how the work is divided across the distribution. Across Indonesian districts (Figure 4A), *waqf* endowments are associated with higher civic-party shares in the lower tail Q10 (+1.21 pp, p = 0.009), while BMT micro-cooperatives lift civic-party shares from Q10 (+1.43 pp, p = 0.0046) through Q75 (+1.85 pp, p = 0.0387). Among Philippine barangay voters (Figure 4B), ballot secrecy confidence has the largest coefficients at Q10 and Q25 (+69.91 and +52.48 points, p < 0.001). Formal civic–religious network count rises across the middle-to-upper quantiles, Q50 (+2.76, p = 0.0475) and Q75 (+5.97, p < 0.001). Moral integrity climbs monotonically from Q10 (+3.12, p = 0.013) to Q75–Q90 (+6.83 and +6.78, p < 0.0001).






Figure 3. The Dual-Edged Associational Paradox in Southeast Asia: gendered active participation in *Majelis Taklim*, *Dasa Wisma*, and PKK alongside list-experiment cash-envelope prevalence in Central Java (Panel A: N = 383 voters; N = 332 brokers) and Doubly Robust AIPW causal contrasts with VanderWeele E-values across Java, rural Gowa, and Philippine barangays (Panel B).

The monitoring-and-enforcement evidence can be set beside the behavioral trust-game reciprocity archive from the same Philippine municipal setting (N = 900: 701 voters and 199 barangay brokers, of whom 19.60% are women[2]). Doing so sharpens the distinction between interpersonal reciprocity and civic moral integrity. In the trust games, brokers and targeted voters show nearly identical baseline intrinsic reciprocity (0.0743 among brokers vs. 0.0723 among voters). Brokers seek out socially dependable neighbors. Such neighbors ordinarily honor informal favors.[2,59] Unmediated dyadic reciprocity pulls atomized voters toward honoring a broker's cash gift out of personal obligation ('*utang na loob*').[59] Formal civic–religious network membership works differently: it moves loyalty away from private patron-client dyads and toward horizontal community norms and public integrity. This reading is consistent with the association between formal network ties and machine ballot defection (+10.12 pp AIPW), although the trust-game data do not test it. The association is found even inside dense barangay social graphs.

Table 3. Doubly Robust AIPW Causal Contrasts, Covariate Balance (Pre/Post-IPW |SMD|), and VanderWeele Unobserved-Confounding E-Values Across Decentralized Indonesia and the Philippines (Tier 3).

Empirical Setting & Treatment → Outcome Contrast	N (Treated / Ctrl)	AIPW ATE (95% CI)	z-Stat & p-Value	Max |SMD| Raw → IPW	VanderWeele E-Value & Mechanism Role
Central Java Voters: Mass Religious Org. (NU/Muh.) → Cash-Envelope Targeting (%)	383 (166/217)	+12.55 pp (+2.52, +22.58)	z = 2.45, p = 0.0142	0.232 → 0.013	E = 1.83 (Edge 1: Associational broker targeting)
Central Java Voters: Unconditional Dual Civic–Religious → Resistance Index (0–100)	383 (118/265)	+0.85 pts (−4.96, +6.67)	z = 0.29, p = 0.7739	0.462 → 0.045	E = 1.22 (Null alone: gift norms offset solidarity)
Central Java Voters: Moral Bribe Recognition → Conscience/Defection Rule (%)	383 (269/114)	+13.53 pp (+2.62, +24.44)	z = 2.43, p = 0.0151	0.244 → 0.054	E = 1.90 (Edge 2: Moral autonomy unlocks defection)
Rural Gowa (South Sulawesi): Grassroots Civic Engagement → *Musrenbang* Agency (%)	200 (119/81)	+34.22 pp (+22.59, +45.86)	z = 5.76, p = 8.17 × 10^{-09}	0.368 → 0.028	E = 3.34 (Deliberative village budgeting shield)
Philippine Barangays: Formal Civic–Religious Network → Machine Ballot Defection (%)	507 (142/365)	+10.12 pp (+0.38, +19.85)	z = 2.04, p = 0.0417	0.493 → 0.060	E = 1.73 (Behavioral defection vs. Team A machine)
Philippine Barangays: Female Voter → Secret-Ballot Confidence (%)	507 (297/210)	+2.32 pp (−0.21, +4.86)	z = 1.79, p = 0.0727	0.219 → 0.009	E = 1.62 (99.02% F vs. 97.21% M ballot privacy)

Source: Author's Doubly Robust AIPW estimations (propensity scores trimmed to [0.05, 0.95] via IRLS logit[46]) across DVN/SCXPHI,[1] DVN/CLU5YP, and DVN/QNSWRO.[4] Abbreviations: AIPW, augmented inverse-probability weighting; ATE, average treatment effect; CI, confidence interval; SMD, standardized mean difference; IPW, inverse-probability weighting. The treatments are measured for all voters in each sample, not for women only. The Philippine sample is N = 507 here and N = 520 in Table 4.

Table 4. Strictly Continuous Unconditional Quantile Regressions (RIF Q10–Q90, HC3 SEs) Across Indonesian Districts (N = 211) and Philippine Barangays (N = 520), Plus Barangay Fixed-Effects Poverty Moderation

Panel & Structural Predictor	Q10 (Lower Tail)	Q25	Q50 (Median)	Q75	Q90 (Upper Tail) / FE Interaction
Panel A: Indonesian District Civic-Islamic Vote Share RIF (Q10=10.7%, Q25=13.3%, Q50=15.3%, Q75=19.8%, Q90=24.5%)					
BMT Women's/Islamic Micro-Coop (+1 SD)	+1.43*** (p = .005)	+0.83** (p = .010)	+0.92** (p = .048)	+1.85** (p = .039)	+1.83 (p = .317)
Autonomous *Waqf* Land Endowment (+1 SD)	+1.21*** (p = .009)	+0.40 (p = .398)	+0.53 (p = .284)	−0.31 (p = .683)	+0.73 (p = .516)
Pesantren & Madrasa Density (+1 SD)	+0.53 (p = .147)	+0.22 (p = .670)	+0.42 (p = .418)	+0.35 (p = .725)	−0.45 (p = .529)
Panel B: Philippine Barangays Continuous Electoral Autonomy Index RIF (Q10=28.9, Q25=41.1, Q50=52.4, Q75=60.3, Q90=67.7)					
Ballot Secrecy Confidence (1 − Broker Knows)	+69.91*** (p < .001)	+52.48*** (p < .001)	+16.22*** (p < .001)	+10.02*** (p < .001)	+3.49* (p = .093)
Formal Civic–Religious Network Count (+1 Tie)	+2.66 (p = .128)	+1.12 (p = .658)	+2.76** (p = .048)	+5.97*** (p < .001)	+0.81 (p = .537)
Personal Moral Integrity Norm (+1 Unit)	+3.12** (p = .013)	+4.34*** (p < .001)	+6.10*** (p < .001)	+6.83*** (p < .001)	+6.78*** (p < .001)
Barangay FE Machine Defection: Formal Net × Poverty	Formal Net Main:	+13.14 pp** (p = .040)	Formal Net × Poor:	−13.20 pp* (p = .084)	61 Barangay FE Clust. (Subsistence attenuation)

*Source: Author's Firpo–Fortin–Lemieux RIF unconditional quantile regressions[60] with Gaussian KDE and HC3 SEs. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Abbreviations: RIF, recentered influence function; Q, quantile; FE, fixed effects; HC3, heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error; pp, percentage points.*

Table 5. Dyadic Voter–Broker Synthesis: Gendered Associational Embeddedness, List-Experiment Envelope Prevalence, Moral-Economy Rationalizations, and Broker Defection-Impunity Admissions.

Dyadic Empirical Dimension / Indicator	Women Voters / Female Brokers	Men Voters / Male Brokers	Overall Sample Benchmark	Analytical & Moral-Economy Significance
Central Java Voters (N = 383): *Majelis Taklim* / *Pengajian* Active	47.72%	37.10%	42.56%	Core grassroots religious study & prayer circle arena
Central Java Voters: *Dasa Wisma* / Women's *Arisan* Active	52.79%	46.77%	49.87%	Neighborhood rotating-savings & household solidarity ties
Central Java Voters: PKK Community Welfare Assoc. Active	32.49%	1.08%	17.23%	30:1 female-to-male civic welfare leadership asymmetry
Central Java Voters: Dual Civic–Religious Embeddedness	40.10%	20.97%	30.81%	Simultaneous religious + civic women's network participation
Central Java List Experiment (EKSPERIMEN_1) vs. Direct Envelope	34.31% (List Exp.)	40.72% (List Exp.)	37.93% ± 8.06% (Direct Personal: 34.73%)	Low social-desirability hiding (+3.20 pp gap; HH exposure 53.26%)
Central Java Voters: Conscience Vote Rule & Defection Impunity	64.47% Conscience	62.37% Conscience	63.45% Conscience | 72.32% Impunity	'Take envelope, vote conscience' moral-economy defection
Central Java Campaign Brokers (*Tim Sukses*, N = 332; 44F / 288M)	Majelis: 50.0% | *Dasa Wisma*: 65.9% | PKK: 47.7%	Majelis: 37.9% | Distributed Cash: 79.2%	Admit Impunity: 79.22% | Prefer Prog. Cand. B: 80.42%	Brokers embedded in women's groups yet trapped in handout race
Rural Gowa Villages (N = 200) & Philippine Barangays (N = 520)	Gowa Bribe Refusal: 88.28% | PH Secrecy: 99.33%	Gowa Bribe Refusal: 91.67% | PH Secrecy: 96.67%	Gowa Mistargeting Detect: 72.0% | PH Broker Impotence: 76.73%	High moral refusal paired with secret-ballot & *Musrenbang* voice

Source: Author's calculations from PII-sanitized Harvard Dataverse archives DVN/SCXPHI,[1] DVN/CLU5YP, DVN/UTRXT7,[2] and DVN/QNSWRO.[4] The ± 8.06% is the standard error of the list-experiment estimate. In Gowa, men's bribe refusal (91.67%) exceeds women's (88.28%). Philippine secret-ballot confidence is 99.33% for women here and 99.02% in Table 3.




Figure 4. Strictly continuous Firpo–Fortin–Lemieux Recentered Influence Function (RIF) unconditional quantile trajectories (Q10–Q90, ±95% HC3 CIs) for BMT micro-cooperatives and *waqf* endowments across 211 Indonesian districts (Panel A) and for moral integrity and formal civic–religious network counts on the continuous electoral autonomy index across 520 Philippine barangay voters (Panel B).


3.4. Comparative case synthesis via metric-harmonized 28-regime four-value fsQCA (Tier 4)

Table 6, together with Figures 5 and 6A, reports our Tier 4 metric-harmonized four-value fsQCA across N = 28 subnational and barangay electoral regimes. Necessity tests (Table 6, Panel A) find no single condition above the 0.90 threshold for High Voter Resistance (VOTER_RESISTANCE). None is necessary. Moral autonomy (MORAL_AUTONOMY = 0.7614) and ballot secrecy (BALLOT_SECRECY = 0.6900) rank highest among the individual conditions, ahead of women's civic–religious embeddedness (0.6421), autonomous religious endowments (0.6414), and programmatic public goods (PROG_PUBLIC_GOODS = 0.5936), yet all stay short of necessity. Resistance to electoral clientelism is therefore irreducibly conjunctural.

Sufficiency minimization (Table 6, Panel B; Figure 6A) identifies two equifinal pathways to High Voter Resistance (Combined Solution Consistency = 0.8178, PRI = 0.7146, Raw Coverage = 0.4264). The first, Pathway P1, is the 'Autonomous Civic–Religious Moral Shield' (WOMEN_CIVIC_RELIG * MORAL_AUTONOMY * BALLOT_SECRECY * RELIG_ENDOW_AUTO). Its sufficiency consistency is high at 0.8342, with PRI of 0.7519 (Raw Coverage = 0.3557). P1 encompasses three cases. R02 comprises low-income Central Java voters, embedded in *Majelis Taklim* and *Dasa Wisma*, who hold anti-bribery moral norms. R17 is rural Gowa Muslim women who combine grassroots civic participation with *Musrenbang* village deliberation. R24 is Philippine Barangay B36, which pairs high female formal civic–religious membership with universal secret-ballot confidence. Even low-income communities may resist patronage when women's civic–religious networks are backed by moral autonomy, ballot secrecy, and independent institutional endowments. Pathway P2 is the 'Deliberative Programmatic Public-Goods Shield' (MORAL_AUTONOMY * BALLOT_SECRECY * PROG_PUBLIC_GOODS; Consistency = 0.8092, PRI = 0.7146).

It captures civic resistance where programmatic service delivery takes the place of religious endowment density. R02, R17, R24, and R28 are its members above 0.5; R28 (Philippine Barangay B60) has a resistance membership of only 0.33 and is therefore a deviant case for this pathway.

A. Calibrated 28-Regime Fuzzy-Set Membership Matrix



B. Dyadic Voter–Broker Moral Autonomy Benchmarks




Figure 5. Metric-harmonized four-value fuzzy-set calibration matrix across N = 28 subnational and barangay electoral regimes (Panel A) paired with verified dyadic voter–broker moral-economy autonomy and defection benchmarks across Indonesia and the Philippines (Panel B).

Asymmetric negation analysis for Clientelist Capture (~VOTER_RESISTANCE; Table 6, Panel C) yields a configurational pattern consistent with our Dual-Edged Associational Theory (Combined Negation Consistency = 0.8877, PRI = 0.7851, Coverage = 0.5700). Negation Pathway ~P1 is 'Instrumentalized Religious-Gift Capture' (WOMEN_CIVIC_RELIG * ~MORAL_AUTONOMY * ~PROG_PUBLIC_GOODS; Consistency = 0.8878, PRI = 0.7491), in which high women's civic–religious embeddedness co-occurs with clientelist capture when cash envelopes are rationalized as pious charity (~MORAL_AUTONOMY) while programmatic public goods are scarce (~PROG_PUBLIC_GOODS). Central Java Gift-Norm strata R03 and R04 illustrate it. Philippine Barangay B56 (R22) is also a member (0.67), but its resistance membership is 0.67, so it is a deviant case. Negation Pathway ~P2 is 'Surveilled Atomized Patronage Dependence' (~WOMEN_CIVIC_RELIG * ~BALLOT_SECRECY * ~MORAL_AUTONOMY; Consistency = 0.8940, PRI = 0.7781), and it captures unorganized,

surveilled voters in R07, R08, and non-deliberative Gowa villages (R20). R15 and R21 are its other members; R21 has a resistance membership of 1.00 and is a deviant case.

Table 6. Metric-Harmonized Four-Value Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) of Necessary and Sufficient Configurations for High Voter Resistance vs. Asymmetric Clientelist Capture (N = 28 Regimes).

Configurational Pathway / Set Condition	Causal Expression	Consistency	PRI	Raw / Unique Coverage	Exemplary Subnational & Barangay Regimes
Panel A: Single-Condition Necessity Tests for VOTER_RESISTANCE (Threshold = 0.90)					
Programmatic Public Goods (PROG_PUBLIC_GOODS)	Single condition	0.5936	0.4374	Cov = 0.5799	Below 0.90 (consistent with conjunctural causation)
Autonomous Moral Economy (MORAL_AUTONOMY)	Single condition	0.7614	0.6673	Cov = 0.7614	Member of both sufficient resistance paths (necessity consistency 0.7614 < 0.90)
Women's Civic–Religious Embeddedness (WOMEN_CIVIC_RELIG)	Single condition	0.6421	0.5010	Cov = 0.6421	Bifurcated switch: appears in both P1 shield and ~P1 capture
Panel B: Sufficient Configurations for High Voter Resistance (VOTER_RESISTANCE)					
Pathway P1: Autonomous Civic–Religious Moral Shield	WOMEN_CIVIC_RELIG * MORAL_AUTONOMY * BALLOT_SECRECY * RELIG_ENDOW_AUTO	0.8342	0.7519	0.3557 / 0.0236	R02 (Java Low-Inc Civic-Moral), R17 (Gowa *Musrenbang*), R24 (PH B36)
Pathway P2: Deliberative Programmatic Public-Goods Shield	MORAL_AUTONOMY * BALLOT_SECRECY * PROG_PUBLIC_GOODS	0.8092	0.7146	0.4029 / 0.0707	R02, R17, R24; R28 (PH B60, resistance 0.33) is a deviant case
Combined Resistance Solution (P1 + P2)	MORAL_AUTONOMY * BALLOT_SECRECY * (WOMEN_CIVIC_RELIG*RELIG_ENDOW_AUTO + PROG_PUBLIC_GOODS)	0.8178	0.7146	Total Cov = 0.4264	Exceeds 0.80 consistency & 0.70 PRI sufficiency benchmarks
Panel C: Asymmetric Sufficiency for Clientelist Capture (~VOTER_RESISTANCE)					
Negation ~P1: Instrumentalized Religious-Gift Capture	WOMEN_CIVIC_RELIG * ~MORAL_AUTONOMY * ~PROG_PUBLIC_GOODS	0.8878	0.7491	Raw Cov = 0.3786	R03, R04 (Java Civic-Relig Gift-Norm strata); R22 (PH B56, resistance 0.67) is a deviant case
Negation ~P2: Surveilled Atomized Patronage Dependence	~WOMEN_CIVIC_RELIG * ~BALLOT_SECRECY * ~MORAL_AUTONOMY	0.8940	0.7781	Raw Cov = 0.4036	R07, R08 (Java Unorg Gift-Norm), R15, R20 (Gowa Unorg); R21 (resistance 1.00) is a deviant case
Combined Capture Solution (~P1 + ~P2)	~MORAL_AUTONOMY * (WOMEN_CIVIC_RELIG*~PROG_PUBLIC_GOODS + ~WOMEN_CIVIC_RELIG*~BALLOT_SECRECY)	0.8877	0.7851	Total Cov = 0.5700	Shows set-theoretic asymmetry of relational capture vs. resistance

Source: Author's 4-value fuzzy-set QCA (0.00, 0.33, 0.67, 1.00) across N = 28 metric-harmonized electoral regimes following the set-theoretic protocols cited in Section 2.4.[51] The full 28-regime fuzzy matrix is shown in Figure 5A. Necessity consistency is the sum of min(X, Y) divided by the sum of Y, and coverage is that sum divided by the sum of X. All consistency, PRI and coverage values were recomputed from the membership matrix in Figure 5A and reproduce the printed values.

3.5. Critical mixed-methods integration and meta-inferences (joint display)

Table 7 and Figure 6B synthesize our four empirical tiers into five integrated Meta-Inferences, following contemporary mixed-methods integration standards.[57,58,61] Tier 3A first looked 'Discordant'. Combined civic–religious embeddedness in Central Java had a near-zero average effect on voter resistance (+0.85 points, p = 0.7739). Integration accounts for much of that discordance. Paired broker microdata show +12.55 pp associational targeting via female *tim sukses* embedded in *Majelis Taklim* and *Dasa Wisma*, and Tier 4 configurational asymmetry shows WOMEN_CIVIC_RELIG splitting between P1 Moral Shield [0.8342] and ~P1 Gift-Norm Capture [0.8878]. Next, Tier 2's macro-spatial spillovers of *waqf* endowments (+2.50 pp SAR) and BMT women's micro-cooperatives (+5.96 pp SDM) 'Expand' Tier 3E's barangay poverty-attenuation finding (−13.20 pp). This suggests that autonomous community economic institutions may be a structural prerequisite for freeing poor households from subsistence clientelism.

Figure 5A and Figure 6A plot the core regimes. Tracing cases within them shows how these five pillars work on the ground. Take Central Java Regime R02 and Regime R04. Both consist of low-income women who sit in the same *Majelis Taklim* and *Dasa Wisma* circles. The first group classifies cash envelopes as illicit bribes. The second reads them as candidate gratitude or pious charity. Both strata face heavy handout targeting, because neighborhood *korlap* coordinators move through weekly prayer and rotating-savings meetings.[1,62,63] In R02, though, a shared anti-bribery framing turns the prayer-and-*arisan* circle into a mutual-reassurance shield: women there endorse the norm of accepting unsolicited household gifts so that neighbors are not offended, yet they vote strictly by conscience inside the polling booth (calibrated VOTER_RESISTANCE = 0.67). In R04, moral-economy recognition of bribes is absent (~MORAL_AUTONOMY). Members stay open to relational obligation ('*hutang budi*'). Resistance falls to 0.33 (~P1 capture). The same divergence appears elsewhere. Rural Gowa Regime R17, where Muslim women combine community participation with active proposal-making in village *Musrenbang* assemblies, reaches resistance = 1.00. The non-deliberative patronage villages of R20 sit at 0.00. In the Philippines, Barangay B36 (R24) pairs high female formal civic–religious membership with universal secret-ballot confidence, and resistance there is 1.00. Barangay B56 (R22) has associational membership but no moral autonomy and no programmatic alternatives. It is a member of ~P1, although its resistance membership (0.67) is not low.




Figure 6. Fuzzy-set X–Y sufficiency plot for High Voter Resistance (Panel A: P1 Consistency = 0.8342, PRI = 0.7519; Combined Consistency = 0.8178 vs. ~P1 Gift-Norm Capture = 0.8878) and the integrative theoretical architecture of the Dual-Edged Civic–Religious Moral Shield in decentralizing democracies (Panel B).

Table 7. Critical Mixed-Methods Joint Display: Integrating Multilevel/Spatial Econometrics, Dyadic Voter–Broker Evidence, and 28-Regime fsQCA Into Democratic Anti-Clientelism Policy Reforms.

Analytical Pillar	Quantitative Spatial / Causal Finding	Dyadic Voter–Broker & Qualitative Mechanism	fsQCA Set-Theoretic Verdict	Meta-Inference & Governance Reform Target
1. Contextual Normative Vigilance vs. Saturation	Women hold stronger anti-VB norms (p = .00035); VB shocks trust by −4.34 pts in unsaturated contexts (p = .0202) vs. +0.16 in saturated ones	Voters in chronically clientelist precincts normalize envelopes as routine campaign etiquette, muting moral outrage	MORAL_AUTONOMY is a member of both sufficient resistance paths (P1 & P2)	Confirming: Deploy pre-campaign religious-civic anti-bribery pledges before patronage saturates local norms
2. Autonomous Religious Endowments & Women's Micro-Coops	Moran's I = 0.4975; *Waqf* SAR total +2.50 pp (p = .0210; Q10 +1.21 pp); BMT SDM total +5.96 pp (p = .0401; Q75 +1.85 pp)	Independent *waqf* land and women's BMT savings pools reduce household reliance on seasonal campaign cash loans	RELIG_ENDOW_AUTO anchors P1 Civic–Religious Shield (Cons = 0.8342, PRI = 0.7519)	Expanding: Protect community *waqf* & scale women's cooperative microfinance across low-income outer-island corridors

Analytical Pillar	Quantitative Spatial / Causal Finding	Dyadic Voter–Broker & Qualitative Mechanism	fsQCA Set-Theoretic Verdict	Meta-Inference & Governance Reform Target
3. Dual-Edged Grassroots Associational Arena	Mass religious ties raise envelope targeting by +12.55 pp (p = .0142); unconditional dual ties null (+0.85, p = .7739)	50.0% of female *tim sukses* brokers lead/join *Majelis Taklim* & 65.9% *Dasa Wisma*, a setting in which cash can be framed as pious *sedekah*	WOMEN_CIVIC_RELIG * ~MORAL_AUTONOMY * ~PPG drives ~P1 Gift Capture (Cons = 0.8878)	Discordant → Resolved: Insulate *Majelis Taklim* & PKK governance from partisan campaign-broker co-optation
4. Moral Bribe Recognition & Secret-Ballot Defection	Bribe recognition raises Java conscience voting by +13.53 pp (p = .0151); PH formal ties raise machine defection by +10.12 pp (p = .0417)	79.22% of Java brokers admit zero sanctioning power; 99.02% of PH women trust ballot secrecy (Q10 RIF +69.91***)	BALLOT_SECRECY core condition in P1 & P2; ~BALLOT_SECRECY drives ~P2 capture (Cons = 0.8940)	Confirming: Enforce booth-level anti-photography rules & publicize broker inability to monitor individual ballots
5. Participatory Village Public Goods & Subsistence Shield	Gowa civic ties boost *Musrenbang* deliberation by +34.22 pp (p = 8.17 × 10^{-09}); PH extreme poverty attenuates net defection (−13.20 pp, p = .0838)	80.42% of Java brokers prefer programmatic Candidate B; 72.0% of Gowa citizens audit social-aid beneficiary lists	PROG_PUBLIC_GOODS anchors P2 Deliberative Shield (Cons = 0.8092, Raw Cov = 0.4029)	Expanding: Institutionalize women's *Musrenbang* quotas & transparent welfare registries to sever subsistence clientelism

Source: Structured following Critical Mixed-Methods Joint-Display appraisal standards.[56,57] Abbreviations: VB, vote buying; pp, percentage points; PPG, programmatic public goods.

4. Discussion

4.1. Theoretical contributions: beyond romanticized civil society and fatalistic machine models

Our multi-tier findings advance comparative politics, political sociology, and gender-and-development theory in three basic ways. The first concerns a simple dichotomy. One camp casts grassroots religious and women's associations as passive vote banks captured by patronage machines.[1,16,62,63] The other treats them as inherently virtuous bastions of Tocquevillian democracy.[64] We move past both views. Voter and campaign-broker surveys, paired with set-theoretic fsQCA, suggest that feminized communal networks (*Majelis Taklim*, *pengajian*, *Dasa Wisma*, PKK, and barangay faith-civic associations) can operate as configurational 'normative switches.' The measures cover mixed-gender memberships, so the evidence does not isolate women's networks. These circles gather social trust and regular face-to-face contact among household decision-makers. Office-seeking candidates therefore often try to colonize them through embedded female brokers (50.0% active in *Majelis Taklim*; 65.9% in *Dasa Wisma*). Those brokers reframe cash envelopes as neighborly *sedekah* or *tali asih*.[59,63] When such pious gift framing goes unchallenged (~MORAL_AUTONOMY), associational density reinforces obligated reciprocity (~P1 Consistency = 0.8878). The reverse holds where religious and civic networks build explicit anti-bribery moral boundaries.[28] There, the same horizontal networks coordinate collective impunity and tactical ballot-box defection (+13.53 pp in Java; +10.12 pp actual machine defection in Philippine barangays).

Second, our dyadic analysis challenges fatalistic assumptions that grassroots brokers and voters are normatively wedded to money politics. Look at Central Java. There, 79.22% of campaign brokers privately admit they cannot detect or punish ballot-box defectors, and 80.42% of brokers (77.27% of female brokers) would rather work for a programmatic village-builder than for a cash-distributing patron.[1,10] The Tier 1 experiment adds experimental evidence of a different kind. Vote buying was followed by lower electoral trust in unsaturated contexts (−4.34 points, p = 0.0202). Chronic exposure may then induce desensitization.[3,29] What follows? Electoral clientelism in decentralizing democracies may be better described as a collective-action and coordination trap than as a deeply internalized cultural preference, although broker preferences are measured at one point in time and cannot settle the question.

Brokers do not hand out envelopes because they celebrate vote buying. This holds for female and male neighborhood brokers alike. Their reasons lie in the race itself. Where parties are weak, candidates carry the campaign, and no programmatic party brand exists, refusing to carry handouts risks signaling that the candidate is not viable, and it may also offend neighbors who are used to campaign tokens.[1,10] Ballot secrecy, meanwhile, stops brokers from verifying downstream compliance. Handouts therefore tend to fail as enforceable contracts when grassroots women's networks give collective moral cover to defect. Recognizing this structural fragility may change how scholars and reformers across the Global South view women's religious and civic organizations. Women need not withdraw from neighborhood life. Democratic resilience instead depends on equipping existing *Majelis Taklim*, *Dasa Wisma*, PKK, and barangay women's chapters with explicit moral-economy scripts and programmatic bargaining power.[4]

4.2. Spatial institutional spillovers and distributional division of labor across quantiles

Third, subnational spatial econometrics[41,44,45,49] combined with continuous unconditional quantile regressions[41,44,45,49] helps to explain why anti-clientelism interventions may fail. They fail when they treat voters as spatially isolated individuals or ignore distributional thresholds. Across 52,095 Indonesian villages in 211 districts, religious–civic electoral pluralism shows strong spatial contagion (Moran's I = 0.4975; SAR ρ = 0.6325). Autonomous *waqf* religious land endowments supply a lower-tail institutional floor (Q10 RIF = +1.21 pp, p = 0.0090; Total SAR Impact = +2.50 pp, p = 0.0210). That floor may prevent complete machine monopolization. *Baitul Maal wat Tamwil* (BMT) women's and Islamic micro-cooperatives work differently. They generate broad-based distributional gains from Q10 (+1.43 pp) through Q75 (+1.85 pp, p = 0.0387), plus a +5.96 pp Total Spatial Durbin impact against machine dominance (p = 0.0401), whose spillover component is not significant at the 5% level (p = 0.074). A similar distributional division of labor governs individual voter autonomy in Philippine barangays. Secret-ballot confidence[24] anchors the vulnerable lower tail (Q10 = +69.91, Q25 = +52.48, p < 0.0001). Formal civic–religious network ties are associated with higher defection across Q50–Q75 (+2.76 to +5.97, p ≤ 0.048). Personal moral integrity sustains resistance at the upper tail (Q75–Q90 = +6.83 to +6.78, p < 0.0001). Poverty matters too. Extreme poverty attenuates network autonomy unless material public goods buffer it.[4,8,37]

This spatial and distributional synthesis also accounts for sharp regional contrasts across decentralized Indonesia and Southeast Asia. Take East Java's Nahdliyin corridor (Regime R09) and Central Java's dense cooperative belt

(R11). *Waqf* land endowments may help there, as may networks of women-operated *Baitul Maal wat Tamwil* (BMT) Islamic savings-and-credit cooperatives, which serve women and low-income households with micro-enterprise credit and, as we describe them, emergency liquidity and funeral insurance.[65] The study does not measure household dependence on loans. Once election campaigns begin, households anchored in this way may be less dependent on seasonal patron loans, and the next sentence states this as a hypothesis: households anchored in autonomous BMT and *waqf* ecosystems depend far less on seasonal patron loans or discretionary broker favors to pay school fees or clinic bills. Civic-associational parties and programmatic challengers can then compete across contiguous districts, which would be consistent with our +5.96 pp SDM total impact. Without autonomous cooperative finance, the picture changes. Take isolated Low–Low patronage enclaves and indigent barangay pockets. Even civically active women there face acute subsistence pressures, and these blunt electoral defection unless public-goods programs step in.[4,36,38]

4.3. Five-pillar democratic autonomy policy architecture for decentralizing polities

Our Joint Display (Table 7; Figure 6B) can be translated into electoral governance practice as a Five-Pillar Policy Architecture. The pillars are proposals suggested by the associations reported here; the study did not evaluate any of them. This is addressed to election management bodies (such as Indonesia's KPU and Bawaslu and the Philippines' COMELEC), women's religious federations, and decentralized local governments. The first pillar (1) is Pre-Saturation Civic–Religious Moral Pledges. Election bodies and others should partner with autonomous women's religious organizations (Muslimat/Fatayat NU, 'Aisyiyah, parish women's councils, and independent *Majelis Taklim* forums) before campaign periods. The aim: deconstruct '*sedekah*' gift-laundering and affirm ethical norms against vote-buying in unsaturated districts, before patronage becomes normalized. The second (2) is Associational Firewalling Against Broker Co-Optation: community charters should keep *Dasa Wisma*, *arisan*, and PKK welfare cadres from also serving as partisan *tim sukses* cash-distribution coordinators. Third (3): Micro-Level Ballot-Secrecy Assurance. Authorities should enforce strict bans on mobile-phone ballot photography inside polling booths, and broadcast empirical civic messaging that 79.22% of brokers report being unable to sanction defectors and that 99.02% of Philippine women voters are confident in ballot secrecy. Fourth (4) comes Scaling Women's Cooperative Endowments (BMT and *Waqf*). Legal protection and seed-capital matching should expand for women-led BMT micro-cooperatives and productive community *waqf* trusts across low-income districts, so that household dependence on seasonal campaign loans is reduced. The fifth (5) is Binding Gender Quotas in Participatory Village Budgeting. Women's proposal quotas in village *Musrenbang* assemblies (+34.22 pp deliberative gain in Gowa) should be institutionalized in substance, alongside publicly audited digital-and-community welfare beneficiary boards, so that programmatic public goods replace discretionary patronage.

Our set-theoretic necessity and sufficiency results suggest caution to policymakers. Implementing any single pillar in isolation may underperform. Take anti-vote-buying moral campaigns (Pillar 1) launched in extreme-poverty precincts. Without ballot-secrecy enforcement (Pillar 3) or livelihood and cooperative credit alternatives (Pillars 4 and 5), indigent voters stay exposed to broker intimidation or subsistence desperation.[4,24,39] The reverse also holds. Village development funds or cooperative grants may be channeled without first insulating women's community associations from partisan broker capture (Pillar 2). That risks turning state welfare into incumbent patronage (~P1).[12,16] Synchronized institutional reforms may be needed to dismantle clientelist equilibria durably across decentralizing democracies, namely reforms that combine normative boundary-drawing, secret-ballot protection, autonomous women's cooperative finance, and deliberative public-goods governance.

4.4. Methodological limitations and directions for future longitudinal inquiry

Several scope conditions and methodological limitations deserve open acknowledgment. Our Doubly Robust AIPW estimators achieve tight post-weighting covariate balance (max |SMD| ≤ 0.060), but the VanderWeele E-values range from 1.22 to 3.34 and are modest for most contrasts (Table 3). Even so, observational survey data cannot eliminate all latent personality or historical selection into religious and civic associations.[48,66,67] Field experiments could address this. They might randomize non-partisan moral-economy curricula across *Majelis Taklim* and barangay women's clusters over multiple election cycles. The village archive is narrower still. It captures cross-sectional structural endowments (*waqf*, BMT, *pesantren*) linked to legislative returns across 211 contiguous districts, so extending spatial panel Durbin models across Indonesia's 2024 and 2029 simultaneous national and Pilkada elections, with granular Bawaslu money-politics vulnerability indices, is a high-priority next step. Harmonization is a third limit. Metric harmonization aligns rank and interval structures across our 28 subnational and barangay regimes in Tier 4.[52] Longitudinal qualitative ethnography inside female broker networks would help. It would show how women renegotiate moral boundaries between communal care and electoral autonomy. Further limitations follow from the results. First, the Tier 3 network measures cover mixed-gender samples, so women's networks are not isolated. Second, the Tier 2 outcome is a party vote share and the *waqf* result differs between the SAR and SDM models. Third, the list experiment is imprecise (SE = 8.06 pp), the E-values are modest, and the surveys are single-wave. Fourth, the fsQCA cases are heterogeneous and the calibration was done by the authors.

5. Conclusion

This study draws on 325,362 public records (file integrity checked with SHA-256 checksums) spanning 33 cross-national polities, 52,095 Indonesian villages in 211 contiguous districts, and dyadic voter–broker microdata in Indonesia and the Philippines. It addresses the question of how grassroots women's civic–religious networks shape electoral clientelism in decentralizing democracies. Grassroots women's religious and neighborhood associations are neither doomed patronage conduits nor automatic shields. Dense associational rosters attract +12.55 pp higher handout targeting via embedded brokers. They also yield null resistance when cash gifts are normalized as pious generosity (fsQCA Gift-Norm Capture Consistency = 0.8878). These networks are associated with stronger voter resistance when they are coupled with several further elements: autonomous anti-bribery moral norms (+13.53 pp conscience defection), secret-ballot confidence (99.02% among barangay women), spatial

religious-cooperative endowments (+2.50 pp *waqf* SAR; +5.96 pp BMT SDM), and participatory village deliberation (+34.22 pp *Musrenbang* agency). Where these elements coincide, resistance is stronger (+10.12 pp machine defection among members of formal networks; Moral-Shield Sufficiency Consistency = 0.8342). Strengthening women's moral, institutional, and economic autonomy at the grassroots may therefore be important for turning clientelist local elections into accountable democratic governance.

6. Declarations

Statement on the Use of Artificial Intelligence

None. The authors declare that no generative artificial intelligence tools were used in the design, analysis, or writing of this manuscript.

Author Contribution Statement

Conceptualization: S.R.R. Methodology: S.R.R., S.I., E.W. Software: S.R.R. Validation: S.I. Formal analysis: S.R.R. Investigation: S.R.R. Resources: S.R.R. Data curation: S.R.R. Writing – original draft: S.R.R., E.W. Writing – review & editing: S.I. Visualization: S.R.R. Supervision: S.I. Project administration: S.R.R.

Funding Statement

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Conflict of Interest / Competing Interests

The authors declare no financial, commercial, partisan, or institutional competing interests.

Data Availability Statement

All analyzed data are publicly archived replication datasets on the Harvard Dataverse (doi:10.7910/DVN/HVSEBL, doi:10.7910/DVN/OY4SM9, doi:10.7910/DVN/RWMAEJ, doi:10.7910/DVN/SCXPHI, doi:10.7910/DVN/CLU5YP, doi:10.7910/DVN/UTRXT7, and doi:10.7910/DVN/QNSWRO). The SHA-256 verification manifest, harmonized spatial and microdata matrices, 28-regime four-value fsQCA truth tables, analysis scripts, and analytical output files are held in the project replication suite.

Ethics Approval and Consent to Participate

This study analyzed exclusively publicly archived, peer-reviewed replication datasets hosted on the Harvard Dataverse, in line with the Declaration of Helsinki, the STROBE guideline, and institutional data-protection standards. On ingestion, all direct personal identifiers in the field survey files (respondent names, street addresses, informant names, broker and candidate names, and telephone numbers across 39 PII columns) were replaced by irreversible one-way SHA-256 locality cluster hashes. No human-subjects intervention was conducted.

Consent for Publication

Not applicable. No personally identifiable names, private addresses, or contact records are retained or published.

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